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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 12-4421 
___________ 
 
MICHAEL A. GARCIA, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA;  
DONNA ZICKEFOOSE, Warden 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil No. 1-11-cv-07030) 
District Judge:  Honorable Jerome B. Simandle 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
May 9, 2013 
 
Before:  FUENTES, FISHER and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: May 20, 2013) 
_________ 
 
OPINION 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Michael A. Garcia, proceeding pro se, appeals from the District Court’s order 
dismissing his petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.  For the 
reasons set forth below, we will summarily affirm. 
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 Garcia was sentenced to eighty-four months’ imprisonment in April 2008, after 
pleading guilty to one count of wire fraud.  His projected release date is in August 2014.  
He filed a § 2241 petition seeking the maximum time allowable for placement in a 
Residential Re-Entry Center (“RRC”) pursuant to the Second Chance Act (“SCA”).1  
Therein, he conceded that he did not exhaust his administrative remedies, arguing that it 
“would be futile and irreparably harmful” for him to do so.  (Dkt. No. 1, p. 24.)  The 
District Court determined that there was no reason to excuse Garcia’s failure to exhaust, 
and dismissed his petition without prejudice.  (Dkt. Nos. 7, 8.)  He timely appealed. 
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253(a).  We exercise 
plenary review over the District Court’s legal conclusions.  Cradle v. United States, 290 
F.3d 536, 538 (3d Cir. 2002).  We may summarily affirm the decision of the District 
Court if no substantial question is presented on appeal.  See 3d Cir. LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 
10.6. 
Federal prisoners are required to exhaust administrative remedies prior to seeking 
a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to § 2241.  See Moscato v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 98 
F.3d 757, 760 (3d Cir. 1996).  However, we have held that the administrative exhaustion 
requirement may be excused if an attempt to obtain relief would be futile or where the 
                                              
1
 According to the Bureau of Prisons’ (“BOP”) regulations, inmates must be 
“considered for pre-release community confinement . . . on an individual basis” and 
within specific time frames.  28 C.F.R. § 570.22.  To that end, a Unit Team must review 
an inmate’s request for pre-release community confinement and make an appropriate 
RRC determination prior to placement. 
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purposes of exhaustion would not be served.  See Woodall v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 432 
F.3d 235, 239 n.2 (3d Cir. 2005). 
Here, Garcia argued that his failure to exhaust should be excused because it would 
have been futile, as other inmates unsuccessfully requested RRC placement, or were told 
to contact their Unit Team managers to determine their eligibility for such placement.  
(Dkt. No. 1, p. 25.)  Essentially, he argued that because his request for RRC placement 
would be denied no matter what, there was no point in making it in the first place.  We 
agree with the District Court that Garcia merely sought to “bypass the administrative 
process entirely and purposely in anticipation of yet-to-be made but preconceived notion 
of his RRC determination.”  (Dkt. No. 7, p. 10.)  That is not a reason to excuse the firm 
requirement of exhaustion.  See, e.g., Callwood v. Enos, 230 F.3d 627, 634 (3d Cir. 
2000); Moscato, 98 F.3d at 760. 
There being no substantial question presented on appeal, we will summarily affirm 
the decision of the District Court dismissing Garcia’s § 2241 petition without prejudice. 
